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Abstract—During disasters, existing telecommunication in-
frastructures are often congested or even destroyed. In these
situations, mobile devices can be interconnected using wireless
ad hoc and disruption-tolerant networking to establish a backup
emergency communication system for civilians and emergency
services. However, such communication systems entail serious
security risks, since adversaries may attempt to steal confidential
data, fake notifications of emergency services, or perform denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. In this paper, we present SEDCOS,
a secure device-to-device communication system for disaster
scenarios. SEDCOS mitigates flooding DoS attacks and offers
role revocation for detected adversaries to withdraw their per-
missions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SEDCOS by large-
scale network simulations.
Index Terms—Security, DoS, Disaster, D2D
I. INTRODUCTION
During floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, nuclear accidents, or
terror attacks, fast disaster response can save human life, limit
environmental damage, and reduce economic loss. Communi-
cation technologies are integral to disaster relief operations.
However, panic reactions and physical damage often lead to
inoperable local communication infrastructures [4].
As an attractive alternative to handheld radios, many re-
searchers have proposed to leverage the ad hoc and disruption-
tolerant networking (DTN) capabilities of mobile devices to
create opportunistic communication networks [9], [12]. In
DTNs, all devices store, carry, and forward data to form a
dynamic, infrastructure-less, and self-organized network. Cov-
erage is increased by adding more devices to the network. In
particular, the approach can be applied to mobile commodity
devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops, which
are ubiquitous and provide diverse ad hoc communication
capabilities (e. g., Wi-Fi and Bluetooth). In this way, people
can continue using their personal devices to request or offer
aid, obtain information from emergency services, or contact
relatives and friends.
However, such opportunistic networks are susceptible to
a wide range of security attacks due to their wireless, co-
operative, decentralized, and resource-constrained nature. For
instance, during wars or terror attacks, adversaries may subvert
the communication system to disrupt disaster relief operations
by injecting false information or performing denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. Furthermore, panicked people may spam the
network with messages, unintentionally jeopardize availability.
Thus, a practical emergency communication system must
ensure confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and availability,
but these properties are difficult to achieve during adverse
events. Existing proposals either lack disaster functionality
or provide an insufficient level of security [3], [13], [14],
[15]. High data availability and reliability are crucial for
emergency notifications and distress signals. Prior work has
improved reliability, but has not assessed secure prioritization
mechanisms that work reliably under attack.
In this paper, we present SEDCOS, a secure device-to-
device communication system for disaster scenarios. Our main
contributions are: (i) a secure communication substrate with
message prioritization and a management scheme that delivers
messages reliably and is resilient against flooding DoS attacks,
and (ii) large-scale network simulations showing SEDCOS’s
effectiveness in maintaining high delivery rates under attack
and revoking user certificates in the field.
II. RELATED WORK
Typical security targets in opportunistic networks are authen-
tication and integrity of messages [17], secure routing [1],
and confidential as well as anonymous end-to-end communi-
cation [5]. Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) is a frequently
suggested solution, since traditional public key cryptography is
often regarded as unsuitable for opportunistic networks due to
the need of accessing public keys, certificates, and revocation
information from central online servers [11]. To eliminate
central authorities, fully decentralized trust-based concepts [2],
[16], or approaches based on threshold-cryptography [10] have
been proposed. However, existing works do not address the
unique challenges of disaster relief communication, such as
a high delivery rate (emergency messages), immobility of in-
dividual users (trapped victims), role-based authentication, or
insider attackers. Denial-of-service attacks on unauthenticated
DTNs have been evaluated, but contrary to previous findings
[1], we show that authentication is essential for reliable oper-
ation. Other works have attempted to hinder flooding attacks
by setting explicit rate limits and trying to detect misbehaving
nodes using a complex distributed detection mechanism [8].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Store, Carry, and Forward. Instead of relying on infras-
tructure, DTN-enabled devices exchange messages directly
using WiFi and Bluetooth. DTNs exploit user mobility to
increase coverage: devices act as “data mules” that store their
messages as well as messages from other users, carry them,
and finally forward them to the destination upon contact. This
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Figure 1: Illustration of our secure key management. The authorization level decreases from left to right, except for citizens.
way, messages propagate in an epidemic manner from device
to device until they reach their destinations. DTN performance
is typically worse than that of infrastructure networks but is
preferable to no communication at all. Nevertheless, devices
with Internet connectivity (cellular or WiFi access points) can
opportunistically act as “wormholes” used for rapid message
distribution to isolated parts of the network.
Adversary Model. We consider an adversary Adv who can
mount network attacks and compromise network entities.
Specifically, Adv can eavesdrop, manipulate, forge, or drop
messages. Furthermore, Adv can assume a limited number
of entities, either by compromising or stealing devices or by
registering multiple times in our system. Unlike the classic
Dolev–Yao adversary model, Adv controls only a part of
the communication channel and a portion of all network
entities. Moreover, Adv cannot break cryptographic primitives
or tamper with the root authority (see Section IV).
IV. SECURE KEY MANAGEMENT
Establishing trust is important to satisfy our security require-
ments. For this purpose, we employ a centralized trust model
using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is shown in
Fig. 1. The PKI consists of multiple hierarchically organized
certificate authorities (CAs), whose root is a dedicated au-
thority named root authority (RA). The RA serves as a trust
anchor, maintains the emergency communication software, and
distributes the software if infrastructure access is still available.
In an initialization phase, before the actual crisis, the RA
establishes relationships to organizations or governments that
want to participate as authorities in the emergency commu-
nication system. All authorities initially undergo a rigorous
audit by the RA, since their authenticity and trustworthiness
are crucial to the overall security. As part of the audit process,
RA and authority agree on user roles as well as preconfigured
user groups that the authority introduces to the network.
For instance, in Fig. 1, the fire service organization added
the user roles team leader and firefighter, and arranged a
preconfigured user group fire service, so users can particularly
address all firefighters when sending a message. Authorities
manage their own PKI and, hence, maintain one or multiple,
potentially hierarchically organized, CAs. The CAs’ public
keys are embedded in the emergency communication software.
After this step, authorities can issue identity certificates. Fur-
thermore, the overall PKI contains at least one authority that
issues identity certificates to unprivileged users, i.e., citizens.
In Fig. 1, the fire service maintains several hierarchically
organized authorities. On the lowest hierarchical CA level,
CAs issue identity certificates to staff members.
Identity certificates bind the public signing keys of users,
which function as their unique network identifiers (see Sec-
tion V-A), to user properties. A vital user property is the user
role, since it is important to assess the content of messages. For
instance, citizens consider medical information more reliable if
they originate from physicians rather than firefighters. Another
essential property is the authorization level that indicates the
permission level and trustworthiness of a user. Fig. 1 shows the
identity certificate of a firefighter team leader, and depicts the
authorization level of entities by their x-coordinate as well as
stars in the certificate. In order to obtain an identity certificate,
users must register with the CA and provide a proof of identity,
e.g., using their identification card, phone number, or address.
The identity proof is vital to hamper multi-registrations, where
a single user obtains multiple identity certificates.
Since an adversary may obtain identity certificates, com-
promise user devices, or even infiltrate authorities, it is im-
portant that certificates can be revoked. SEDCOS implements
certificate revocations via certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
that are broadcasted with high priority in the network. We
distinguish between two different entities: authorities and
users. An authority A can revoke an entity E if A has a higher
authorization level than E , and there is a certificate chain
(i.e., a chain of trust) between A and E . Upon the revocation
of an authority, all certificates that the authority issued in
the past and will issue in the future are regarded as invalid,
withdrawing its power. In case a user identity certificate
is revoked, the respective user becomes an uncertified and
unprivileged user, hence, loses its user role, authorization level,
and any message transmission privileges (see Section V-B).
V. RESILIENT COMMUNICATION
In this section, we first give an overview of our communication
protocol and then explain the design of our DoS-resistant
buffer management.
A. Protocol Overview
Message Format and Types. All SEDCOS messages have
the same format and include the following fields: message
type, sender and receiver addresses, creation time and lifetime
(together yielding the time-to-live (TTL)), sender signature,
and the optionally encrypted payload. We note that all header
fields are immutable, that is, they are not changed in transit,
thus, allowing the signature to protect the entire message. The
message type can be: (i) Certificate Revocation Lists; (ii) Net-
work control with subtypes for acknowledgments and the
device-to-device message exchange handshake; (iii) Content
sent by users. Acknowledgments are sent by the destination
upon reception of a message.
Message Authenticity and Confidentiality. Each user pos-
sesses a unique Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA)
signature key pair. The public part of the key serves as a
unique addressable network identifier. Each outgoing message
is signed using this key and can optionally be augmented
with the identity certificate. Devices verify messages at each
hop by checking the message signature and, if available, the
sender’s identity certificate; and discard them if any check
fails. Hence, corrupted messages do not propagate in the
network. To achieve data confidentiality, each user generates
its own Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
encryption key pair during initialization. Consequently, send-
ing or receiving confidential messages requires the message
payload to be encrypted with the public or decrypted with the
private ECIES key of the receiving user.
Message Storage. Each device reserves persistent memory for
storing its own as well as others’ messages. We refer to this
memory space as the buffer. Its capacity C depends on the
device capabilities and can be adjusted by the user. Efficiently
managing the buffer is crucial for delivery reliability, as shown
in Section VI.
Message Exchange. When two devices discover each other via
Bluetooth or Wi-Fi beacon frames, they connect to exchange
messages. We use epidemic dissemination, i.e., nodes try to
exchange all carried messages. This introduces redundancy in
the network, which helps when single nodes “disappear” (low
battery or mobility). However, due to limited buffer capacity
and possibly short contact times (i. e., two cars passing each
other), not all messages might be exchanged. Thus, we ex-
change messages in the following order: (i) messages destined
for B, (ii) messages from privileged users (authorities), (iii) all
other messages.
B. Source-based Elastic Buckets
Proper buffer management is essential to prevent resource
starvation attacks such as flooding. Malicious nodes can easily
exploit trivial implementations such as FIFO queues contain-
ing all messages to replace valid messages with bogus ones [7].
To counter such attacks, we employ a novel buffer man-
agement strategy called Source-based Elastic Buckets (SEB)
that, by design, prevents valid messages from being purged
during flooding attacks. The basic idea is that all messages
from a source s are placed in an isolated bucket B such that
messages from different sources cannot influence one another.
SEB is fair in the sense that each bucket has a guaranteed
capacity of CB = bC/nc where n is the number of currently
allocated buckets (= number of source nodes we currently
Algorithm 1 Source-based Elastic Bucket Insertion
Input: msg, buckets, C
1: s← source of msg
2: if not buckets contains bucket for s then
3: insert new empty bucket for msg in buckets;
4: end if
5: Bs ← bucket from buckets for s;
6: insert msg into Bs;
7: while occupancy of buckets exceeds C do
8: B̂ ← bucket from buckets with the highest occupancy;
9: remove message with the lowest rank from B̂;
10: if B̂ is empty then
11: remove B̂ from buckets;
12: end if
13: end while
carry messages from). The occupancy of a single source bucket
OB is subject to OB ∈ [0, C] and
∑
s OB ≤ C. If s does
not exhaust its guaranteed capacity (OB < CB) because it
has not sent “enough” messages, free capacity (CB −OB) is
shared by other buckets requiring it. However, when s sends
a message at a later point, overdrawn buckets (OB > CB)
are emptied first. These elastic quotas allow full exploitation
of local buffer capacities while maintaining strict message
separation of different source nodes. Algorithm 1 shows SEB’s
message insertion procedure: the underlying idea is that SEB
inserts new messages in the appropriate (source) bucket and
then drops messages from the highest occupant bucket until
the total occupancy meets C. Note that a node will always
try to make space for its messages by dropping its messages
last. This is to ensure that there is at least one copy of every
message in the network. However, if a device injects too many
new messages (exceeding C), its buffer overflows, and SEB
eventually has to drop own messages. Within each bucket,
SEB prioritizes: (i) security control messages (revocation cer-
tificates), (ii) network control messages (acknowledgments),
and (iii) messages with the longest remaining TTL.
SEB’s robustness relies on the fact that messages are source-
authenticated and on the relatively high costs of acquiring
new identities in our system. Without the latter costs, an
attacker could assume multiple identities, flood the network
with messages and, thus, hijack a disproportional amount of
buffer capacity.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the impact of flooding attacks by
several privileged devices (due to theft or compromise), and
their eventual revocation from the system.
Scenario. We consider three different user classes with a
total of 1000 nodes: 850 citizens, 100 authorities, and 50
attackers. Within each group, there are 5 % cars (10–50 km/h),
all others move at walking speed (1.8–4.5 km/h). Citizens
can transmit low-priority messages, while authorities sent with
high priority (interval: 15–25 s). We compare SEB to a classic
FIFO queue, both using epidemic routing. The buffer capacity
C is 5 MB. We use the ONE simulator v1.6.0 [6] as well as
the default Helsinki map for our experiments and average the
results over ten differently-seeded runs. We assume Bluetooth
communication with 2 Mbit/s and a range of 10 m.
Flooding Attack and Revocation. We evaluate the impact
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(c) Buffer occupancy with SEB
Figure 2: Flooding attack and revocation. The attack starts at TC = 3 h and the revocation certificate is issued at TR = 9 h.
of an attacker being able to compromise privileged devices.
In this case, the attacker is able to inject bogus high-priority
messages into the network, thus, increasing their chances to
remain in the nodes’ buffers for a long time. In this experiment,
two events occur: at TC = 3 h, the attackers start the flooding
attack using compromised devices; and after a reaction time
of 6 h at TR = 9 h, an authority issues and injects the
revocation certificate into the network. When a node receives
the revocation certificate, it drops all messages it carries from
the revoked nodes and blacklists future messages by those
nodes. Attackers ignore revocation certificates.
Before the attack. Figure 2a shows the delivered benign
messages (low and high) over time. In the beginning, SEB
quickly starts to successfully deliver most messages. FIFO
follows the same start-up behavior but is not able to keep up
from the 30 minutes mark. After 30 minutes, buffers are filled
up (Fig. 2b) and the lack of proper buffer management leads
to poor delivery performance.
During the attack. At the start of the attack, SEB’s delivery
probability remains almost unaffected by the flooding attack
even though buffers quickly fill up to 70% with bogus
messages (Fig. 2c). The decrease in delivery probability is only
about 10% (Fig. 2a) demonstrating the effectiveness of the
source-based elastic buckets: they assure that bogus messages
cannot overtake the entire buffer capacity. FIFO reacts less
visibly to the attack since the delivery probability is already
low at TC (Fig. 2a). Yet, the impact is apparent in Fig. 2b
where bogus messages steadily take up more buffer capacity,
leading to continuously decreasing delivery probability.
Aftermath. FIFO does not recover from the attack after
TR, since only a few nodes receive the revocation certificate
due to the lack of a prioritization mechanism. With SEB,
the revocation certificate propagates quickly throughout the
network: half of the nodes are informed within 12 minutes
while full network penetration is reached in less than one hour.
The drop of bogus message buffer occupancy shortly after TR
indicates the revocation certificate’s effect (Fig. 2c). As the
certificate propagates in the network, buffer occupancy restores
to a state similar to t < TC . Nevertheless, a small fraction
of bogus messages remains in the network since attackers
ignore the revocation certificate and keep their messages in
their buffers.
VII. CONCLUSION
A secure and reliable communication system is essential for
effective disaster response. We have presented SEDCOS, a
system that enables secure and reliable disruption-tolerant
emergency communication on commodity mobile devices.
SEDCOS is the first secure emergency communication system
that enables the exclusion of adversaries while providing
authentic and confidential group communication. Under DoS
attacks, SEDCOS increases the message delivery rate by a
factor of 6 compared to a contemporary DTN protocol. Finally,
SEDCOS provides a timely revocation (less than one hour) for
withdrawing any power of an insider adversary.
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